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Introduction  
This paper is written at a time (February 2008) when the New Zealand dairy industry has 
been debating significant structural change.  In part this is because in November 2007 the 
dominant Fonterra Co-operative announced proposals to change its capital structure to 
become a publicly listed company, albeit at least initially with majority ownership by a 
supplier co-operative.  These Fonterra proposals were supposed to be voted on by farmers 
in May 2008.  However, on 15 February 2008, Fonterra Chairman Henry van der Heyden 
wrote to farmer shareholders saying that the vote would now be deferred.  It is clear that 
this deferral was in response to widespread feedback that the proposals would have been 
soundly rejected if put to the vote. 
 
The Fonterra Chairman also stated in his February 2008 letter that Board members 
‘remain firm in our view that the [proposed] option is the best solution to address 
redemption risk, shareholder choice and capital for growth’.  However, the reality is that 
these existing proposals are flawed.  The reasons for this will be explored in this paper. 
 
Despite the flaws inherent in the existing proposals, the pressure for capital structuring 
will not go away.  The reasons for this are that there are fundamental weaknesses in the 
existing structure relating to redemption risk, farmer choice, and capital for growth.  
Some of these risks relate not only to the structure itself but the way in which the fair 
value share concept is being managed.  There are alternative structures that can deal with 
all of these challenges and also maintain farmer control over those parts of the business 
over which farmers need control.  These too will be explored in this paper. 
 
There are also other structural changes currently occurring within the New Zealand 
industry.  In particular, the entry of new business entities to the processing and marketing 
sector of the New Zealand dairy industry is changing the industry landscape.  Whereas at 
the time of its formation in 2001 Fonterra had a market share in excess of 95 percent of 
all NZ-produced milk, this will have declined by the 2008/09 season to about 90 percent, 
with further declines likely. 
 
This decline in market share is caused primarily by the entry of four new investor 
oriented firms (ie non co-operatives).  These are Open Country Cheese, Dairy Trust, 
 1
Synlait and New Zealand Dairies.  In addition, the regional Westland Dairy Co-operative 
has been growing faster than Fonterra, and now comprises about 4 percent of the national 
industry.  The Tatua Co-operative in the Waikato has a market share of approximately 1 
percent.  There are also other emerging small players such as Kaimai Cheese. 
 
Precisely how the industry will develop in future years is a matter of conjecture.  
However, most of the new entrants have publicly announced plans for further expansion.  
In particular, Dairy Trust has stated its intention to build plants in the Waikato, at 
Wanganui and in Northland to complement their Awarua (Southland) milk powder 
operation that will commence in August 2008.  In addition, there are tentative plans for at 
least one new co-operative. 
 
If these various plans come to fruition then it is reasonable to assume that non-Fonterra 
capacity could quickly increase towards 20 percent of the total industry.  It could go 
higher.  And once particular plants are built, then even if the initial entrepreneurs are less 
than successful, the plants themselves are likely to continue under restructured capital 
arrangements. 
 
Company Strategies  
It is notable that each of the non-Fonterra entities has a different strategic approach. 
 
Westland Dairy Co-operative has to date focused primarily on commodities and business-
to-business (B2B) marketing without significant ownership of consumer brands.  Despite 
the need to build up their marketing activities from a standing start once they separated 
from the Dairy Board early this decade, they have maintained payouts per kg MS (ie milk 
fat plus protein) that have on average at least matched those of Fonterra. 
 
What is also notable is that this has been achieved despite the preponderance of Jersey 
cattle within their milk catchment.  These Jersey cattle have a higher fat to protein ratio 
than the Friesians which predominate in most parts of New Zealand.  Given the fact that 
fat is worth less than protein, achieving competitiveness on this particular benchmark (i.e. 
for overall MS price) is particularly impressive. 
 
Tatua has focused on branded products, plus sophisticated R&D led ingredients as 
elements of their total marketing mix, but has found the most recent years to be 
challenging.  In part this is because some of their niche products such as lactoferrin have 
become commodity products once Fonterra entered those markets.  In part it has also 
been because value-add products do not always have high net margins after accounting 
for the cost-add. 
 
Open Country Cheese initially set out to focus on high value consumer cheeses but found 
that more money could be made from producing bulk cheeses.  They have subsequently 
broadened their product mix, first with a whey plant in 2006/07and currently with a milk 
powder plant.  They have acknowledged that their initial one-product strategy (ie cheese) 
exposed them to competitive milk supply risks.  This was caused by cross-product 
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volatility of prices, combined with the fact that their major competitor (Fonterra) had a 
much broader product mix. 
 
The Dairy Trust strategy is currently to focus on production of commodity milk powders 
and to market these using the services of Open Country Cheese, in which they acquired 
majority ownership as from late 2007. 
 
Synlait’s strategy is to focus on cow-to-customer operations including the possibility of 
feed-based strategies to influence milk characteristics.  Their customers will be other 
businesses (B2B marketing) rather than final consumers. 
 
NZ Dairies, with a plant at Studholme in South Canterbury, have a focus on providing 
milk powders to their Russian shareholders, Nutritek.  Currently there is debate and 
indeed some turmoil relating both to this strategy, and the level of foreign ownership 
within the capital structure. 
 
The Fonterra Strategy 
In contrast to the smaller players, Fonterra has a much more diverse strategy. 
 
It is clear that Fonterra is the world leader in relation to cross-border trade in 
commodities and dairy ingredients.  This dominance arises not only from the marketing 
of products produced in New Zealand, but also from marketing milk produced elsewhere. 
 
In the case of Australia, Fonterra processes milk within Australia and then markets the 
products both within Australia and internationally.  In some other countries, such as the 
USA, Fonterra’s role is limited to international marketing of products produced there by 
other companies.  There is a range of statistics in circulation as to the overall market 
share that Fonterra has in internationally traded dairy commodities and ingredients, with 
most estimates being about 40 percent. 
 
In contrast to the situation with commodities and ingredients, Fonterra’s global role in 
short life chiller-cabinet consumer products is quite small.  The vast majority of these 
products are produced and marketed behind borders, with Nestle and Danone being two 
of the dominant entities. However there is also a myriad of smaller players. 
 
Fonterra has a significant share of this chiller-cabinet market in Australia (one recent 
industry estimate is 21 percent) and also has strengths in some parts of South Asia (such 
as Sri Lanka) and South East Asia (such as Malaysia and Singapore).  But overall, 
Fonterra is a small player with no brands that could support claims of being ‘global’. 
 
Fonterra’s ‘Brands’ business provides only a modest contribution to Fonterra’s bottom 
line.  At times there is confusion about the contribution of ‘Brands’ arising from 
confusion as to how Fonterra uses the term ‘value-add’.  In fact the contribution of 
‘Brands’ is only one component of what Fonterra calls its ‘value-add’.  Much of this 
value-add actually comes from processing raw milk into commodities and ingredients. 
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Fonterra’s Annual Report for 2006/07 reports that ‘Brands’ earned an operating surplus 
of $324 million.  This is described as being an EBIT figure.  In other words, much of this 
(almost certainly the majority, given the amount of capital involved) will go to servicing 
debt and only the minority will have flowed through to a final profit (or payout) figure.  
This final figure is not disclosed.  The contribution of ‘Brands’ within the current 
2007/08 season is expected to be even lower than 2006/07 on account of high internal 
transfer values for the commodity inputs. 
 
Fonterra’s Focus on Growth  
It is clear from various industry presentations by the Fonterra leadership team, plus the 
CEO’s and Chairman’s Reports within Fonterra’s 2006/07 Annual Report, that Fonterra 
has a strong focus on growth.  The key message is that Fonterra needs to continue 
growing if it is to retain its position in the world.  The status quo is seen as not being an 
option. 
 
The challenge with the Fonterra growth strategy is that Fonterra’s supply of New Zealand 
produced milk is showing only minor growth.  Indeed there is a threat of negative 
growth, particularly in the North Island, from a loss in market share. 
 
The challenges for Fonterra are compounded by their assessment that future world 
growth will be predominantly in fresh products.  Fonterra’s assumption is that this 
increase in demand can only be met by ‘behind-borders’ operations.  In other words, it 
will require supply chains that produce milk in the country of final consumption rather 
than in New Zealand. 
 
 
The Value Proposition for ‘Behind-Borders’ Operations 
The date, the value proposition as to why Fonterra should operate behind borders has not 
been well enunciated.  Rather, it has been a simplistic statement that this is where the 
growth is so this is where we have to be.  What is now needed is more detailed 
information as to how New Zealand can capture benefits in this particular business. 
 
New Zealand’s competitive advantage currently lies in its ability to produce milk on a 
seasonal basis at low cost from pastoral systems in an environment where grass grows all 
of the year, albeit with low grass production in winter.  These systems work brilliantly in 
New Zealand but do not transfer readily to most regions of the world. 
 
We do not have significant expertise in producing milk in continental environments, 
where grasses do not grow throughout the year, and where the systems rely on large 
quantities of conserved feed.  Nor do we have competitive advantage when it comes to 
producing short-life products on the basis of 365 days per annum.  Others are much more 
experienced at this than we are. 
 
Nor have we demonstrated to date that we are any better than or even as good as the local 
people when it comes to marketing short-life consumer products in Shanghai, Moscow 
and Sao Paulo.  Undoubtedly there will be opportunities to transfer New Zealand 
 4
technology, but the value proposition needs to be carefully researched.  And there needs 
to be recognition that there are plenty of traps for the unwary. 
 
There also needs to be clear recognition that the Nestlés, Danones and Krafts of this 
world are already there, wherever we might wish to go.  It is a tough business in which 
there will be losers as well as winners. 
 
Fonterra’s Proposals. 
The proposals announced in November 2007 were that Fonterra should become a 
publicly listed entity on the share market.  A new Fonterra supply co-operative would, at 
least initially, be the majority (65 percent) shareholder.  Individual farmers would also 
hold shares directly in the listed company (15 percent) and these would be tradable, 
including to non farmers.  Further, there would be a competitive 20 percent placement of 
shares to the public and this would provide additional equity capital. 
 
Supposedly, these proposals were designed to provide capacity for future growth that is 
not related to New Zealand production.  In addition, the aim was (and is) to reduce 
redemption risk and provide farmer shareholders with choice in their Fonterra share 
portfolio.  However, the capacity of the proposals to achieve any of these is questionable. 
 
Capital Comparisons 
The desired new capital at Fonterra will come from the placement of shares on the 
sharemarket.  The amount that will be earned will depend on the value that the open 
market puts on these shares.  To estimate what this might be requires an estimate of the 
value of the current business. 
 
Fonterra’s balance sheet shows an equity position of approximately $5 billion.  However, 
the proposed fair value share standard for June 2008 is $7.01, and this capitalises to about 
$8.5 billion.  But Fonterra’s assumptions behind the $7.01 valuation need careful 
scrutiny.  Based on the current projected value-add for 2007/08 of only 20 cents, this 
gives a price to earnings ratio of 35 which is more than double the ratios that are typically 
found on the stock exchange. 
 
If the fair value share is realistic, then a 20 percent share placement could be expected to 
bring in about $2 billion of new capital.  If the balance sheet is considered to be a more 
realistic indicator than the fair value share, then the figure would be about $1.25 billion. 
 
To explore what $2 billion or thereabouts might purchase, some international 
comparisons are in order. 
 
Several years ago Fonterra engaged in a bidding war with San Miguel for the purchase of 
National Foods in Australia.  San Miguel won that war, but late in 2007 sold the business 
to Japanese brewer and beer marketer Kirin for $AUD2.8 billion.  National Foods is 
unlikely to become available to Fonterra in the foreseeable future, but a somewhat 
smaller company, Dairy Farmers, is expected to become available for purchase within the 
 5
coming year.  Trade expectations are that it will sell for something in excess of $AUD 1 
billion. 
 
Purchase of Dairy Farmers would significantly increase Fonterra’s market share in 
Australia but it would not give Fonterra market dominance.  It is also known that there is 
likely to be significant competition to purchase this company, with widespread interest 
from food and beverage companies (not just dairy companies) who are wanting to 
diversify their lines. 
 
Looking further afield, the purchase in late 2007 by Danone of the Dutch firm Numico 
for approximately $NZ20 billion provides an illustration of the scale required to become 
a global player.  Numico holds the lead position in infant formula in many parts of the 
world.  Clearly, if Fonterra wanted to take on a purchase of this scale then considerably 
more equity capital would be required than would be available from a 20 percent public 
shareholding. 
 
To put matters further in perspective, industry sources value Danone at about $NZ60 
billion and Nestle at about $300 billion. 
 
Of course Nestle is much more than a dairy company; it is an international food 
company.  But that in itself illustrates an important point: the way to exert market 
influence with supermarkets is to be a food business with product diversity rather than 
just a dairy business. 
 
The inescapable conclusion from the above is that if Fonterra really wants to become an 
international marketer of consumer products then it will have to raise a great deal more 
capital than is consistent with retaining farmer shareholder control. 
 
Shareholder Choice at Fonterra 
The proposed new Fonterra model gives farmers some investment choice, in that they can 
either sell what will be their initial individual shares, or purchase additional public shares.  
Hence they will have choice over the total extent of their business investment.  But where 
they will not be given choice is in the type of investment that they wish to make.  Their 
investment will span the whole range of the company’s activities (relating to New 
Zealand produced milk, ‘behind-borders’ milk, fast moving consumer goods etc) in the 
same proportion as the company actually undertakes those activities.  In other words, 
there is no allowance made for differing farmer risk profiles for different types of 
investment. 
 
Redemption Risk 
This is the risk that co-operatives face of having to purchase back co-operative shares 
from departing members.  It is a risk that companies with traded shares do not have to 
face.  Accordingly, the proposed Fonterra structure will result in there being no 
redemption risk for the publicly listed company.  However, the redemption risk for the 
new supply co-operative will be considerable.  This supply co-operative’s only assets will 
be its shares in the publicly listed company.  Borrowing against these shares to fund 
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redemption would be possible to some extent, but the risk premium would almost 
certainly be considerably more than what Fonterra currently pays for borrowed funds.  
The alternative strategy for the co-operative would be to fund redemption by selling its 
shares in the publicly listed company.  But this, of course, would have major implications 
for retention of farmer control. 
 
Redemption risk is becoming a much more important issue for Fonterra than in the past.  
The reason for this is the emerging competition from new entrants to the processing 
sector.  It can also be argued that Fonterra is currently making it particularly easy for 
these new processors to attract dairy farmer suppliers by placing a high value on the fair 
value share which is apparently unrelated to the value-add component of the milk price.    
 
 
The Kerry Comparison 
The current Fonterra proposals have structural similarity to the Kerry model.  During the 
1970s and early 1980s Kerry was one of numerous Irish dairy co-operatives.  EU milk 
quotas constrained their ability to grow.  In 1986 Kerry converted to become a public 
liability company (Kerry Group PLC).  Even prior to this they had diversified, including 
into meat processing.  Their so-called agribusiness division, which includes the 
processing of their suppliers milk, is now only about 3 percent of the total business, and 
dairy products marketing, including from non-supplier milk, is less than 10 percent of 
their total business. 
 
There is no doubt that Kerry has been a huge success, particularly in the years leading up 
to about 2000.  Since then growth has been harder to achieve.  Here in New Zealand they 
market Master Foods herbs and spices.  Within the Irish dairy industry they remain a 
small player.  Other Irish co-operatives have tried to emulate the Kerry experience but 
with less success. 
 
At least five Nuffield scholars from New Zealand have investigated the Kerry Group 
within the last eleven years as part of their Nuffield investigations.  Most have expressed 
major reservations as to whether or not it is an appropriate model for New Zealand.  
Detailed reports from Catherine Bull, Marise James and Jim van der Poel are available on 
the Nuffield website (www.nuffield.org.nz). 
 
Milk Pricing Issues 
The Fonterra proposals will require a raw milk price to be paid to farmers and profits to 
be paid to shareholders.  At the time of writing Fonterra has not announced how it 
proposes to do this. The difficulty is that Fonterra holds such a dominant position in the 
milk supply market that the milk price to farmers is whatever Fonterra says it is.  Even 
with the new entrants, because each is regional in its operations, there will be a lack of a 
competitively determined milk price.  The new entrants are all setting their prices relative 
to Fonterra. 
 
Currently, both milk price and ‘value-add’ are bundled up in the price that farmers get for 
their milk.  This system works (despite flaws as perceived by some economists) given the 
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proportionality between farmer milk supply and farmer shareholding.  But this will no 
longer be the case with the proposed system. Accordingly, how the allocation is made 
between milk price and profits becomes crucial, both for suppliers and investors.  
 
The challenge is that in any non market system, with Fonterra as the dominant entity, 
there is circularity in how the milk price is calculated.  The profits depend on the cost of 
raw milk.  But the value of the raw milk depends on the capital charge associated with 
processing this milk into products that do have a clear market value.  And the capital 
charge depends on the value of assets, which in turn is a function of profits.  There is no 
escape from this circularity. 
 
Alternative Structures 
There are alternative structures that may better meet the goals of growth while also 
reducing redemption risk and increasing choice.  These options relate to genuine two 
company models, with one being investor oriented and the other a co-operative.  (I say 
‘genuine’ because the current Fonterra proposal is also sometimes described as being a 
two company model, but one - the co-operative - would really be only a shell that owned 
shares and distributed returns to farmers.) 
 
The short-life international ‘brands’ component of the business, based on milk produced 
behind borders, would be floated off as an investor oriented businesses.  This would be 
consistent with the notion that this is the capital intensive part of the business which 
many farmers are unwilling to finance, and which needs access to share market equity 
capital. 
 
With this two company model, the assets and operations associated with the processing 
and international marketing of commodities and ingredients would remain within the co-
operative.  This would be consistent with the notion that farmers must retain control over 
the processing and marketing of their own milk, at least until it is in a stable long-life 
form for which there are genuine market prices. 
 
In relation to choice of investment, the two company model has advantages because 
farmers can decide not only the quantum of their total investment but also the strategic 
focus.  Farmers can invest in the brands business independent of their co-operative 
investment in commodities and ingredients. 
 
The two company model also has less redemption risk.  It removes from the co-operative 
that part of the business which is not only high capital but which also leads to intangible 
assets (brands) which are difficult to value in the absence of a market for the shares.  It 
also leaves the co-operative with significant tangible assets that can be used for security.  
Further, because there is investment choice, it reduces the risk of disgruntled suppliers 
exiting from the co-operative. 
 
A further advantage of this model is that it avoids the need to administratively set a raw 
milk price.  Farmers provide the co-operative with capital in proportion to their 
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production (as at present) and are paid the value of the commodities and ingredients that 
are produced. 
 
A significant perceived disadvantage of this two company model is that it supposedly 
breaks the cow to consumer chain.  But this is more perceived than real.  The reality is 
that behind-borders milk production for chiller-cabinet marketing of short life products is 
a very different supply chain to the seasonal production of long life products from New 
Zealand milk. 
 
There are a number of variations on this proposed two company model.  One such 
variation relates to the extent of the co-operative shareholding in the listed company, and 
whether this shareholding is divested to individual farmers.  Another relates to whether 
there should be different international brands companies for different regions of the 
world. 
 
The alternative structures set out above are all predicated on the assumption that Fonterra 
needs to grow at a faster rate than the New Zealand production industry is likely to grow.  
However, if this assumption does not hold then additional possibilities arise.  Indeed in 
this situation the existing Fonterra structure has much to commend it.  The major 
qualification is that if Fonterra continues to set their so called fair value share at huge 
multiples to the value-add, then there is considerable redemption risk.  There is nothing 
inherently wrong with the concept of a fair value share as long as that value relates back 
to reality. 
 
Putting UHT in the Mix 
UHT is widely perceived in New Zealand as an inferior product.  However, in many parts 
of Europe it is the dominant form of ‘fresh’ milk.  In many markets of Asia it is the only 
realistic option. 
 
Conventional wisdom says that transporting UHT milk from New Zealand to Asia makes 
no sense.  However, sea transport costs for transporting containers of UHT to Asia 
comprise only a small component of the final price (less than 5 percent).  UHT therefore 
becomes a long life ‘fresh’ product that does not necessarily have to be produced behind 
borders.  In high growth tropical countries such as Indonesia (240 million people) and 
Vietnam (100 million people) this UHT milk will always be imported given the 
difficulties of producing it locally. 
 
Conclusions 
It is clear that there is widespread feeling within the dairy industry that the current 
Fonterra capital restructuring proposals are unacceptable.  The likelihood that Fonterra 
can get the necessary 75 percent shareholder approval now appears to be very low, even 
allowing for deferment of the vote.  However, if farmers continue to reject the current 
proposal that does not necessarily mean that farmers are rejecting change.  Rather, they 
want to make sure that, with so much depending on the final outcome, their leaders have 
got it ‘right’. 
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The starting point in getting the appropriate solutions is to place the initial focus on 
strategy.  In particular, the value proposition around ‘behind-borders’ operations has to be 
analysed and enunciated much more clearly.  This includes spelling out why Fonterra can 
expect to out-compete other groups who have local knowledge and in some cases have a 
much longer and deeper history in consumer businesses. 
 
The criteria of growth, redemption risk and choice are all relevant.  The challenge is to 
come up with solutions that genuinely address all three, and do so in a way that protects 
New Zealand’s existing industry. 
 
The danger for Fonterra is that the Board and management are committed to a flawed 
proposal.  There seems to be an unwillingness to consider options that are fundamentally 
different to that which has been proposed.  The cost of Fonterra getting it wrong will be 
that increasing number of farmers will be attracted away to supply other processing and 
marketing entities.  There comes a point beyond which Fonterra cannot afford that to 
happen. 
 
 
***** 
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